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A QUESTION OF FAIRNESS
CLAY M. POWELL*

In the recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in The Queen v
John Wray (pronounced June 26, 1970), Mr. Justice Spence, in his dissenting
judgment, quotes the principle, nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, as being "the
most basic principle in our criminal law".
The Wray case is of considerable interest and firmly establishes two
evidentiary principles:
(a) The rule enunciated by former Chief Justice McRuer in The King
v St. Lawrence [1949] O.R. 215 is accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada
majority judgment as being a correct statement of the law in Canada. That
rule states:
"Where the discovery of the fact confirms the confession- that is, where the confession must be taken to be true by reason of the discovery of the fact - then that
part of the confession that is confirmed by the discovery of the fact is admissible,

but further than that no part of the confession is admissible."
(b) A trial Judge does not have a discretion to reject evidence, even of
substantial weight, if he considers that its admission would be unjust or unfair
to the accused or calculated to bring the administration of justice into
disrepute.
The six Judge majority of the Supreme Court (Cartwright, C.J.C.; Hall, J.
and Spence, J. dissenting) overturned a judgment of the Ontario Court of
Appeal which had dismissed an appeal by the Attorney General for Ontario
against the acquittal of John Wray upon a charge of non-capital murder. The
Ontario Court of Appeal appeared to be so firmly convinced that such a wide
judicial discretion to exclude admissible evidence did exist, counsel representing Wray was not called upon during the argument in that Court.
The trial of John Wray had taken place at Peterborough, Ontario, in
October, 1968, and following the completion of the Crown's case, the presiding
Judge, Mr. Justice Henderson, directed a verdict of not guilty.
Briefly stated, the evidence had established that, a few minutes after noon
on Saturday, March 23, 1968, a hold-up took place at a service station near
Peterborough, during which a young man working at the station was shot
through the heart, dying almost instantaneously. A small amount of money,
about $55.00, was taken from the till.
There were no eye witnesses to the shooting, but a 12-year-old boy
working in the rear of the service station heard "a crack" after the deceased
had gone to the front office of the station to see why two dogs had started to
growl. The young boy found the deceased lying on the floor and, looking out
the front window, saw someone running away from the scene carrying a rifle.
* Ontario Department of Justice.
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An empty brass cartridge shell was located later by police from the
parking area in front of the service station.
About the time of the shooting, a white Ford car was seen parked on a
back road not far from the service station.
An examination of the murder bullet indicated that it had been fired
from a 44-40 rifle.
Almost three months later, on June 4, 1968, at approximately 10:30 in
the morning, an Ontario Provincial Police Inspector asked John Wray to
accompany him to the O.P.P. headquarters at Peterborough and the accused
agreed. A discussion took place and the accused was asked if he would take
a lie-detector test, to which the accused replied: "I have nothing to hide, I will
take the test."
The accused then went to Toronto with the Inspector, arriving about 2:30
in the afternoon, at the office of a private investigator, who had a polygraph
machine. An interrogation then took place with both the private investigator
and the police Inspector taking turns asking questions relating to the murder.
It was some time after 7:00 p.m. that the accused signed a statement in
the form of questions and answers and, as pointed out in the dissenting judgment of Chief Justice Cartwright, that statement, if admitted, would have been
evidence on which the jury could have convicted the accused of the charge
against him.
The statement ended as follows:
"Q. What happened to the gun?

A. I threw it in the swamp.
Q. Where?

A. Near Omemee.
Q. Will you try and show us the spot?

A. Yes.
Q. Is there anything else you wish to add to this John?

A. Not now thank you.
(signed) JOHN WRAY
7:18 p.m."

Following the signing of this statement, the accused went with the police
in a car and directed the police to a swampy area, approximately 15 miles from
the scene of the shooting. They drove directly through the village of Omemee
to get there. The accused told the police to look for a clearing and a large
pine tree, and on the following morning, a short distance from a pine tree
where the accused had taken the police, a rifle barrel and action were found.
A piece of the stock was found further north. The rifle was found to be a
Winchester 44-40 and expert evidence was adduced that the slug taken from
the body of the deceased had been fired from the rifle found in the swamp
and from no other weapon.
At the trial, a lengthy voir dire was held, following which the trial Judge
found the statement to be not a voluntary one, and, accordingly, refused to
permit it to be introduced in evidence. Having in mind the nature of the
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interrogation which took place giving rise to the written statement, one could
not seriously question the trial Judge's ruling in this regard.
The Crown then sought to introduce evidence to the effect that the
accused had led the police to the swamp where the gun was found and, in so
doing, relied upon the judgment in the St. Lawrence case. Mr. Justice
Henderson agreed that, on the St. Lawrence principle, the evidence was admissible, but he accepted the argument of Mr. Carter for the defence that, as a
trial Judge, he had an overriding discertion to exclude any evidence if, in his
opinion, its admission would operate unfairly against the accused.
The ruling out of this evidence left such a fragmentary Crown case that
the directed verdict of acquittal could do nothing but follow.
While the trial Judge based his ruling upon a concept of fairness to the
accused, the Court of Appeal, without hesitation, expanded the discretionary
concept and declared that any evidence could be excluded if, in the opinion
of the trial Judge, its admission would be "calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrepute'.
In delivering the majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada,
Mr. Justice Martland dealt with this last proposition in the following way:
"I am not aware of any judicial authority in this country or in England which
supports the proposition that a trial judge has a discretion to exclude admissible
evidence because, in his opinion, its admission would be calculated to bring the
administration of justice into disrepute."

In dealing with the concept of "unfairness" to the accused, Martland, J.
stated:
"The allowance of admissible evidence relevant to the issue before the court and
of substantial probative value may operate unfortunately for the accused, but not
unfairly."

In separate reasons delivered by Mr. Justice Judson, the issue is dealt
with in the following way:
"In this appeal we are clearly faced with the question whether we should make new
law and give a trial judge a discretion to exclude relevant and admissible evidence
if he thinks that it will operate unfairly against the accused or, according to his
opinion, bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The reason given for the
unfairness here is that the weapon was discovered partly as a result of the accused
going with the police officers and pointing out the place where the weapon was
concealed. In my opinion, there is no justification for recognizing the existence
of this discretion in these circumstances. This type of evidence has been admissible
for almost 200 years. There is no judicial discretion permitting the exclusion of
relevant evidence, in this case highly relevant evidence, on the ground of unfairness
to the accused."

During the course of the argument before the Supreme Court, it was
advanced by the Crown that, if an accused is tried according to proper principles of law, and if the evidence adduced against the accused is clearly
admissible in law, the trial could not be considered "unjust or unfair" to the
accused.
In his dissenting judgment, the Chief Justice was, it is submitted, clearly
wrestling with this problem.
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In his reasons, he stated:
"The evidence which the Crown sought to adduce, far from having only trifling
weight, might well have been found by the jury to be decisive; it is implicit in the
reasons of the Court of Appeal that they regarded it as of substantial weight.
I have difficulty in defining the conditions which would render a trial conducted
strictly according to law "unjust or unfair" to an accused but the difficulty of
defining the circumstances which call for its exercise does not necessarily negative
the existence of the discretion which we are considering. . . Once it has been
decided that the confession is inadmissible because of the manner in which it was
obtained but that part of it becomes admissible in law because it is verified by the
discovery of the murder weapon in the place in which the accused in the course
of the confession stated it to be, the court is faced with a choice of deciding either
that because it is relevant, of great weight and admissible in law it must be received
or that because it was obtained or extorted by such means that to admit it would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute in the minds of right-thinking men
but,
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judge
may in his
not without
discretionbyexclude
it. Theof choice isCJ.B.C.
a difficult
one;
hesitation,
occasioned
the reasons
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In delivering his dissent, Mr. Justice
Spence clearly stated his views of
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"I am
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as he very properly did,
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This statement by Mr. Justice Spence, it
is submitted, raises a very
difficlt question.
According to His Lordship, the administration of justice would have been
brought
disrepute
fact that into
had the
it was
abletoto introduce in evidence the
the accused
whoCrown
led thebeen
police
miles from the murder scene and, in effect, directly an isolated swamp area 15
to the murder weapon.
Putting aside the facts in the Wray case for a
tration of justice would be not only brought moment, surely the adminisinto disrepute, but subject to
public condemnation if all the legally admissible
evidence which might lead
to the conviction of a cold-blooded killer was
not tendered in court.
While it is certainly not the intent to advocate
improper police tactics to
obtain evidence, it is submitted that it must
not
be
of crrne and their families and the communities forgotten that the victims
where crimes take place
these are all persons who must be considered
as
well.
Surely, the concept of
fairness can not be said to only extend to
people accused of crime and, had
the Supreme Court of Canada not overruled
the judgment of the Ontario
Court of Appeal, it is submitted that all the
established rules of evidence would
have become subject to an overriding discretionbased
upon what any particular
court happened to feel was "fair" to an accused.
The
Crown, it is submitted,
would have been placed in an impossible position.
Could the Crown anticipate
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that what is considered fair in Corner Brook, Newfoundland, would also be
considered fair in Montreal, or Toronto, or Vancouver?
It is submitted that the concept of fairness or unfairness, as the case may
be, is no basis to determine the admissibility of evidence and the Supreme
Court has rightly rejected this uncertain test.
In the first paragraph of this comment, I indicated that Mr. Justice Spence
had quoted as being the most basic principle in our criminal law the maxim
nemo tenetur seipsum accusare- "no one is bound to accuse himself".
While this is certainly true in the sense that our system of criminal justice
assumes an accused person to be innocent, and places upon the Crown the
onus of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, there are certainly many
statutory provisions which conflict with that maxim and which can have a
considerable bearing on subsequent criminal charges.
Perhaps the classic example in Canadian criminal jurisprudence can be
found in the case of Rex v Mazerall [1946] O.R. 762, a judgment of the
Ontario Court of Appeal. The accused was charged with conspiracy to commit
an indictable offence, to wit a breach of The Official Secrets Act. The Crown
introduced as part of its case certain admissions made by the accused before
a Royal Commission. The Commissioners were expressly empowered to summon before them any person or witness and to require them to give evidence
on oath. In the exercise of this authority, the Commissioners administered an
oath to the accused and he was examined by counsel for the Commissioners
and also by the Commissioners themselves. The questions put to the accused
and his answers thereto were taken down in shorthand and extracts from a
transcript of this evidence were put in as evidence by the prosecution on the
trial of the accused. The evidence was important as forming a link in the chain
connecting the accused with the conspiracy and its admission was strongly
objected to by the defence at the trial. The trial Judge admitted the evidence
and the accused was convicted.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario held that, since the accused had given
evidence on oath before a Royal Commission duly appointed and acting within
its authority, the Crown could introduce his sworn testimony as part of its case,
and it was not necessary that the Crown first prove that the answers made by
the appellant were "voluntary" in the sense that they were not induced by any
threat or promise.
Mazerall had been arrested on February 15, 1946, and held in custody
by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, with no charges laid against him, and
on February 27, he was brought before a Royal Commission, the members of
which were The Honourable Robert Taschereau, and The Honourable R. L.
Kellock, both Judges of the Supreme Court of Canada. Mazerall was sworn
and examined by the Commissioners and by counsel representing the Commission and he was not represented by counsel.
It is, perhaps, of interest to note that the Crown in the Mazerall case was
led by J. R. Cartwright, the former Chief Justice, who dissented in the
Wray case.
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At the trial, it was argued that, since Mazerall had, in effect, been forced
to give evidence incriminating himself, the rules relating to the admissibility
of confessions should apply and the statement be rejected as not being voluntary. Many arguments were advanced to support the view that the evidence
ought not to be admitted, and the maxim quoted by Mr. Justice Spence was
referred to at length during the argument, but the arguments were all rejected
by the trial Judge.
It is also, perhaps, of interest to note that the trial Judge in the Mazerall
case was the former Chief Justice of the High Court, J. C. McRuer, author of
the recent volumes relating to the state of Civil Rights within Ontario.
The Mazerall case is, therefore, an example of a situation where a person
has clearly incriminated himself, although perhaps it could perhaps be argued
that he was not "forced" to do so.
There are today, however, many statutory provisions requiring persons
to, in effect, incriminate themselves and, while these statutory provisions relate
to matters in certain specified fields, the use which can be made of such testimony taken under oath is almost without limit.
While it is true that many persons summoned to give evidence under oath
before various tribunals claim the protection of the provisions of the various
Evidence Acts, the testimony given can, in many cases, provide valuable
investigative leads. As in the Mazerall case, a Royal Commission can, likewise, provide a great aid to law enforcement officials.
The recent Royal Commission investigating the collapse of Atlantic
Acceptance is a prime case in point.
Many criminal charges have been laid and persons successfully prosecuted as a direct result of evidence obtained under oath before the Royal
Commission. It would be, indeed, an understatement to suggest that police
investigators could have unearthed a fraction of the material gained by the
use of subpoena before the Royal Commission.
It is hoped that the tribunals in Canada will not be placed in the position
where they become a mockery, as they have in the United States. How can
any person maintain confidence in an investigatory tribunal such as a Senate
subcommittee investigating organized crime, when the likes of Frank Costello
can sit before that tribunal day after day refusing even to acknowledge their
own names, on the ground that it might tend to incriminate them.
It is perhaps trite to say that an innocent man has nothing to hide, and it
is certainly not being suggested here that wider powers should be extended to
the Crown to force people to incriminate themselves, but it is suggested that
a balance of interests must be maintained. Surely, there can be nothing wrong
with a jury finding out that John Wray knew where the murder weapon was
hidden.

